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Abstract. The cost of LTL model checking is highly sensitive to the
length of the formula under verification. We observe that, under some
specific conditions, the input LTL formula can be reduced to an easier-to-
handle one before model checking. In our reduction, these two formulae
need not to be logically equivalent, but they share the same counterex-
ample set w.r.t the model. In the case that the model is symbolically
represented, the condition enabling such reduction can be detected with
a lightweight effort (e.g., with SAT-solving). In this paper, we tentatively
name such technique “Counterexample-Preserving Reduction” (CePRe,
for short), and finally the proposed technquie is experimentally evaluated
by adapting NuSMV.
1 Introduction
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL, for short) [11] is one of the most frequently used
specification languages in model checking (cf. [14]). It designates properties over
a linear structure, which can be viewed as an execution of the program. The
task of LTL model checking is to search the state space (explicitly or implicitly),
with the goal of detecting the existence of feasible traces violating the speci-
fication. If such traces exist, the model checker will report one of them as a
“counterexample”; otherwise, the model checker will give an affirmative report.
It can be shown that the complexity of LTL model checking M |= ϕ is in
O(|M |×2|ϕ|), meanwhile, the nesting depth of temporal operators might be the
major factor affecting the cost in compiling LTL formulae.
Hence, it is reasonable to simplify the specification before conducting model
checking. For example, in [12], Somenzi and Bloem provided a series of rewriting
schemas for simplifying LTL specifications, and these rewriting schamas preserve
logical equivalence.
One may argue that “a majority of LTL formulas used in real applications are
simple, succinct rather than complicated”, but, we need to notice the following
facts:
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– Typically, the LTL formula F(pUq) is usually considered as a “simple” one,
nevertheless, it can be further simplified to Fq, and this fact tends to be
omitted.1
– Indeed, people do use complicate specifications in the real industrial field,
as well in some standard benchmark (cf. [2]).
– Last but not least, not all specifications are designated manually. Actually,
some formulae are generated by specification-generaton-tools (e.g., ProSpec).
Indeed, one may find that lots of these machine-generated specifications can
be simplified.
Symbolic model checking [10] is one of the most significant breakthrough in
model checking, and two major fashions of symbolic model checking are widely
used: one is the BDD-based manner [6], and the other is SAT-based manner,
such as bounded model checking [1].
Instead of using an explicit representation, the symbolic manner represents
state space with a series of Boolean formulae. This enables implicit manipulation
of the verification process and it usually leads to an efficient implementation [3].
Meanwhile, such a unified representation of transitions and invariants of the
model potentially provides heuristic information to simplify the specification.
For example:
– The formulae pUq and (rUp)Uq can be respectively reduced as q and (rUp)∨
q, if we know that p→ q holds everywhere in the model.
– Each occurrence of Gθ in the specification can be replaced with > (i.e.,
logically true), if we can inductively infer that the Boolean formula θ holds
at each reachable state in the model.
Actually, we can make certain of these conditions with the following efforts.
– To check whether “p → q holds everywhere in the model”, we may test if
p → q is an invariant in the model — i.e., if ρ ∧ ¬(p → q) is unsatisfiable
(we in the later denote it as ρ ` p→ q), where ρ is the Boolean encoding of
the model’s transition relation.
– Likely, to justify that θ holds at each reachable state, it suffices to ensure
that θ0 ` θ and ρ ` θ → θ′, where θ0 is the initial condition of the model.
Hence, this provides an opportunity to replace the specification with a simpler
one, accompanied with some lightweight extra task of condition detection. Even
if such detection fails, the overhead is usually negligible.
In this paper, we systematically investigate the above idea, and tentatively
name this technique CounterExample-Preserving REduction (CePRe , for short).
Such reduction can be done before starting model checking, and it is an orthogo-
nal optimization technique to both encoding approaches and model compression
techniques.
To justify it, we have extended NuSMV and implement CePRe as an up-
front option for LTL model checking. Subsequently, we conduct experiments over
1 On one hand, pUq implies Fq, and hence F(pUq) implies FFq (i.e., Fq); on the
other hand, q implies pUq, and hence Fq implies F(pUq).
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both industrial benchmarks and randomly generated cases. Experimental results
show that CePRe can improve the efficiency significantly.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 revisits some basic notions. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the CePRe technique and gives the performance analysis. In
Section 4, experimental results over industrial benchmarks as well over random
generated cases are given. We summarize the whole paper with Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We presuppose a countable set P of atomic propositions, ranging over p, q, p1,
etc. For each proposition p ∈ P, we create a primed version p′ (not belonging
to P) for it. For each set V ⊆ P, we define V ′ , {p′ | p ∈ V}. We use B(V) to
denote the set of Boolean formulae over V, similarly, we denote by B(V ∪ V ′)
the set of Boolean formulae over V ∪V ′. The scope of the prime operator can be
naturally lifted to Boolean formulae over B(V), by defining
(¬θ)′ , ¬θ′ (θ1 ∧ θ2)′ , θ′1 ∧ θ′2 (θ1 ∨ θ2)′ , θ′1 ∨ θ′2.
An assignment is a subset V of P, intuitively, it assigns 1 (or, true) to propo-
sitions belonging to V, and assigns 0 (or, false) to other propositions. For each
V ⊆ U ⊆ P and θ ∈ B(U), we denote by V  θ if θ is evaluated to 1 under the
assignment V.
A united assignment is a pair (V1,V2), where both V1 and V2 are subsets
of P. It assigns 1 to propositions belonging to V1 ∪ V ′2, and assigns 0 to other
propositions. Suppose that V1,V2 ⊆ U ⊆ P and θ ∈ B(U ∪ U ′), we also write
(V1,V2)  θ if θ is evaluated to 1 under the united assignment (V1,V2).
LTL formulae can be inductively defined as follows.
– ⊥ and > are LTL formulae.
– Each proposition p ∈ P is an LTL formula.
– If both ϕ1 and ϕ2 are LTL formulae, so does ϕ1 → ϕ2.
– If ϕ is an LTL formula, then Xϕ and Yϕ are LTL formulae.
– If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are LTL formulae, then both ϕ1Uϕ2 and ϕ1Sϕ2 are LTL
formulae.
Semantics of an LTL formula is defined w.r.t. a linear structure pi ∈ (2P)ω
(i.e., pi is an infinite word over the alphabet 2P) and a position i ≺ ω. Inductively:
– pi, i |= > and pi, i 6|= ⊥;
– pi, i |= p iff pi(i)  p (where pi(i) is the i-th letter of pi, which can be viewed
as an assignment for it is a subset of P);
– pi, i |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 iff either pi, i 6|= ϕ1 or pi, i |= ϕ2;
– pi, i |= Xϕ iff pi, i+ 1 |= ϕ;
– pi, i |= Yϕ iff i > 0 and pi, i− 1 |= ϕ;
– pi, i |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff there is some j ≥ i, s.t. pi, j |= ϕ2 and pi, k |= ϕ1 for each
i ≤ k < j;
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– pi, i |= ϕ1Sϕ2 iff there is some j ≤ i, s.t. pi, j |= ϕ2 and pi, k |= ϕ1 for each
i ≥ k > j.
For the sake of convenience, we usually directly write pi, 0 |= ϕ as pi |= ϕ.
As usual, we employ some derived Boolean connectives such as
¬ϕ , ϕ→ ⊥ ϕ ∨ ψ , ¬ϕ→ ψ ϕ ∧ ψ , ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
and derived temporal operators such as
Fϕ , >Uϕ Zϕ , ¬Y¬ϕ Oϕ , >Sϕ
Gϕ , ¬F¬ϕ Hϕ , ¬O¬ϕ
ϕRψ , ¬(¬ϕU¬ψ) ϕTψ , ¬(¬ϕS¬ψ)
We say that ∧ and ∨, F and G, O and H, Y and Z, U and R, T and S are
pairwise the dual operators.
Temporal operators like X, U, F, G, R are called future operators, whereas
Y, Z, S, O, H and T are called past operators. We say an LTL is pure future
(resp. pure past) if it involves no past (resp. future) operators.
Theorem 1 ([7]). Each LTL formula has an equivalent pure future expression.
Theorem 1 tells the fact that past operators do not add any expressive power
to LTL formulae. Nevertheless, with these, we can give a much more succinct
description in defining specifications.
Given an LTL formula ϕ, we denote by sub(ϕ) the set constituted with
subformulae of ϕ. Particularly, we respectively denote by subU(ϕ) and subS(ϕ)
the set of ϕ’s subformulae consisting of “U-subformulae” and “S-subfomulae”.
An U-formula (resp. S-formula) is a formula rooted at U (resp. S).
A model is a tuple M = 〈V, ρ, θ0,F , C〉, where
– V ⊆ P, is a finite set of atomic propositions.
– ρ ∈ B(V ∪ V ′), is the transition relation.
– θ0 ∈ B(V), is the initial condition.
– F ⊆ B(V), is a set of fairness constraints.
– C ⊆ B(V)×B(V), is a set of compassion constraints.
A derived linear structure of M is an infinite word pi ∈ (2V)ω, such that
1. pi(0)  θ0;
2. (pi(i), pi(i+ 1))  ρ for each i ≺ ω;
3. for each ϕ ∈ F , there are infinitely many i’s having pi(i)  ϕ;
4. for each (ϕ,ψ) ∈ C, if there are infinitely many i’s having pi(i)  ϕ, then
there are also infinitely many j’s such that pi(j)  ψ.
We denote by L(M) the set of derived linear strctures of M , call it the
language of M .
For a model M and an LTL formula ϕ, we denote as M |= ϕ if pi |= ϕ for
each pi ∈ L(M). Meanwhile, we define
CE(ϕ,M) , {pi ∈ L(M) | pi 6|= ϕ}
and call it the counterexample set of ϕ w.r.t. M .
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3 Counterexample-Preserving Reduction
We describe the CePRe technique in this section, and we would fix components
of the model M , and just let it be 〈V, ρ, θ0,F , C〉.
For M , we are particularly concerned about formulae having the same coun-
terexample set — we say that ϕ and ψ are inter-reduce-able w.r.t. M if and only
if CE(ϕ,M) = CE(ψ,M), denoted as ϕ ≈M ψ. Hence, ϕ ≈M ψ implies that
M |= ϕ⇔M |= ψ.
The central part of CePRe is a series of reduction rules being of the form
Cond B ϕ ≈M ψ (name)
where “Cond” is called the additional condition.
Though the relation ≈M is, actually symmetric, we always write the formula
being reduced on the righthand of the “≈” sign in reduction rules. Since the
model M is fixed, in this section, we omit it from the subscript. In addition, if
the additional condition trivially holds, we will discard this part, and directly
write the rule as ϕ ≈ ψ, and we say such a reduction rule “model-independent”;
in contrast, we call other rules “model-dependent”.
3.1 The Reduction Rules
First of all, we have some elementary reduction rules as depicted in Figure 1.
For the rules (Init), (Ind) and (Trans), the notation “`” occurring in the
condition part standards “inferring” relation in propositional logic (ρ ` θ iff
ρ ∧ ¬θ is unsatisfiable), and we here require that θ, θ1, θ2 ∈ B(V).
θ0 ` θ B θ ≈ > (Init) ρ ` θ B Gθ ≈ > (Trans)
θ0 ` θ; ρ ` θ → θ′ B Gθ ≈ > (Ind)
θ ∈ F B GFθ ≈ > (Fair) (θ1, θ2) ∈ C B (GFθ1 → GFθ2) ≈ > (Comp)
Fig. 1. Elementary reduction rules.
Subsequently, let us define a partial order “v” over unary temporal operators
(and their combinations) as follows:
F v GF v FG v G
F v Xi v G (i ≺ ω)
O v HO v OH v H
where X0ϕ , ϕ and Xi+1ϕ , X(Xiϕ).
5
Assume that Pw,Ps ∈ {F,FG,GF,G,O,HO,OH,H} ∪ {Xi | i ≺ ω} and
Pw v Ps, then we have two model-indenpendent rules, as depicted in Figure 2.
Though these rules seem to be trivial, they are useful in doing combinational
reductions (see the example given in Section 3.2).
(Pwϕ ∧Psϕ) ≈ Psϕ (Conj) (Pwϕ ∨Psϕ) ≈ Pwϕ (Disj)
Fig. 2. Reduction rules of (Conj) and (Disj).
Figure 3 provides some reduction rules that can be used to simplify nested
temporal operators. Moreover, we may immediately get such a rule’s “past ver-
sion” by switching U and S, R and T, etc. For example, we may obtain the rule
(OS) (i.e., O(ϕSψ) ≈ Oψ) from (FU) .
F(ϕUψ) ≈ Fψ (FU) ϕU(Fψ) ≈ Fψ (UF)
FFϕ ≈ Fϕ (FF) GFGϕ ≈ FGϕ (GFG)
Fig. 3. Reduction rules for formulae involving nested pure future operators.
Meanwhile, we also have the Duality Principle for model-independent rules:
“by switching each operator with its dual operator, then we may get a new
reduction rule”. For the rules listed in Figure 3, we may obtain the corresponding
rules such as (GR), (RG), (GG) and (FGF). As an example, the rule (GG) is
just GGϕ ≈ Gϕ.
Yϕ ≈ ⊥ (Y) Oϕ ≈ ϕ (O) ϕSψ ≈ ϕ (S)
Fig. 4. Reduction rules for formulae involving (outermost) past operators.
Since we always stand at the starting point when doing model checking (i.e.,
the goal is to check if pi, 0 |= ϕ for each pi ∈ L(M)), hence, we can sometimes
“erase” the outermost past operators, as shown in Figure 4. Note that we can
also acquire the rules (Z), (H) and (T) according to the Duality Principle. Just
beware the exception that the rule (Z) should be Zϕ ≈ >.
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XYϕ ≈ ϕ (XY) FHϕ ≈ Hϕ (FH)
FOϕ ≈ Fϕ ∨Oϕ (FO) F(ϕSψ) ≈ Fψ ∨ ϕSψ (FS)
Fig. 5. Reduction rules for formulae involving adjacent past and future operators.
Figure 5 introduces a series of rules handing formulae involving adjacent past
and future temporal operators. Remind that the rules (XZ), (GO), (GH) and
(GT) are also immediately available.
ρ ` θ1 ∨ θ2 B θ1Uθ2 ≈ Fθ2 (U)
ρ ` θ2 → θ1 ∨ θ′2 B θ1Rθ2 ≈ θ2 (R)
Fig. 6. Reduction rules of (U) and (R).
From now on, we let θ1, θ2, . . . range over B(V), and let ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . be arbitrary
LTL formulae. We have some model-dependent rules. The first group of such
rules are listed in Figure 6.
In Figure 7, another set of reduction rules are provided, and these rules are
mainly concerned with LTL formulae involving adjacent U-operators. Note that
when applying the Duality principle to model dependent rules, besides switching
the operators, we also need to exchange the antecedent and subsequent in the
condition part. As an example, we may obtain the reduction rule
ρ ` θ3 → θ2 B (ϕ1Rθ2)Rθ3 ≈ θ3 ∧ (ϕ1Rθ2) (RR[3→ 2])
by applying the Duality Principle to (UU[2→ 3]).
Lastly, Figure 8 provides some reduction rules that can be used to simplify
formulae with mixed usage of U and R. Similarly, dualize operators and inverse
the additional condition, one may obtain reduction rules for formulae in which
R appears (adjancently) out of U.
3.2 Reduction Strategy
We show the usage of CePRe reduction rules by illustrating the reduction
process of M |= (θ1Uθ2)Uθ3:
1. We may first try with the rule (UU[1 → 3]) by inquiring the SAT-solver if
ρ ` θ1 → θ3 holds.
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ρ ` θ1 → θ2 B θ1Uθ2 ≈ θ2 (U[1→ 2])
ρ ` θ1 → θ3 B (θ1Uϕ2)Uθ3 ≈ ϕ2Uθ3 (UU[1→ 3])
ρ ` θ2 → θ3 B (ϕ1Uθ2)Uθ3 ≈ θ3 ∨ (ϕ1Uθ2) (UU[2→ 3])
ρ ` θ3 → θ2 B (ϕ1Uθ2)Uθ3 ≈ (ϕ1 ∨ θ2)Uθ3 (UU[3→ 2])
ρ ` θ2 → θ′3 B (ϕ1Uθ2)Uθ3 ≈ (ϕ1 ∨ θ2)Uθ3 (UU[2→ 3′])
ρ ` ¬θ2 → θ3 B (ϕ1Uθ2)Uθ3 ≈ Fθ3 (UU[¬2→ 3])
ρ ` θ1 → θ2 B θ1U(θ2Uϕ3) ≈ θ2Uϕ3 (UU[1→ 2])
ρ ` θ1 → θ3 B θ1U(ϕ2Uθ3) ≈ ϕ2Uθ3 (UU[1→ 3])
ρ ` θ2 → θ1 B θ1U(θ2Uϕ3) ≈ θ1Uϕ3 (UU[2→ 1])
Fig. 7. Reduction rules for formulae involving adjacent U operators.
ρ ` θ1 → θ3 B (θ1Rϕ2)Uθ3 ≈ ((θ1Rϕ2) ∨ θ3) ∧ Fθ3 (UR[1→ 3])
ρ ` ¬θ1 → θ3 B (θ1Rϕ2)Uθ3 ≈ ϕ2Uθ3 (UR[¬1→ 3])
ρ ` θ1 → θ3 B θ1U(ϕ2Rθ3) ≈ ϕ2Rθ3 (UR[1→ 3])
Fig. 8. Reduction rules for formulae involving adjacent U and R operators.
2. If the SAT-solver returns “unsatisfiable” with the input ρ∧θ1∧¬θ3, it implies
that the additional condition is stated, and we may replace the specification
with θ2Uθ3.
3. Otherwise, we will try with the next reduction rule, such as (UU[2→ 3]).
In fact, these rules can also be “locally applied” to subformulae. For example,
to make a local reduction of (FU), we may replace each occurrence of F(ϕUψ)
in the specification with Fψ. The only exception is for the group of rules listed in
Figure 4: observe that we have Yϕ ≈ ⊥ according to (Y), yet this does not imply
that FYϕ ≈ F⊥ holds. Hence, these rules have an “implicit condition” when
doing local application: the subformula to be reduced must occur “temporally
outermost” in the specification — i.e., the target subformula is not in the scope
of any temporal operators in the specification.
Compositional use of reduction rules may lead to a more aggressive reduction.
For example:
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Input: The original specification ϕ.
Output: The specification having been reduced.
1 let Γ := ∅; /∗ Γ memorizes the sub-formulae with infeasible condition∗/
2 let ∆ := {ψ ∈ (sub(ϕ) \ Γ ) such that ψ matches some reduction rule(s)};
3 foreach ψ1, ψ2 ∈ ∆ s.t. ψ1 6= ψ2 do
4 if ψ1 ∈ sub(ψ2) then
5 ∆ := ∆ \ {ψ1}; /∗ i.e., we only proceed “max” subformulae ∗/
6 end
7 end
8 if ∆ = ∅ then
9 return ϕ;
10 end
11 foreach ψ ∈ ∆ do
12 let Θ := the set of rules that can be applied to ψ;
13 /∗ note that we have |Θ| ≤ 5 for each ψ ∗/
14 while Θ 6= ∅ do
15 choose R := (CondB ψ ≈ η) in Θ ;
16 if Cond is stated then
17 ϕ := ϕψη ; /∗ ϕψη is obtained from ϕ by replacing ψ with η ∗/
18 break;
19 end
20 Θ := Θ \ {R};
21 end
22 ∆ := ∆ \ {ψ};
23 if Θ = ∅ then
24 Γ := Γ ∪ {ψ} ; /∗ ψ would be excluded in the next iteration ∗/
25 end
26 end
27 goto 2;
Algorithm 1: The “max-match” rule-selection strategy.
1. For the task of model checking M |= FOp, we may firstly change the goal
as M |= Fp ∨Op, according to the rule (FO).
2. Now, the subformula Op is a temporally outermost one, hence we may take
a local application of (O), and then the goal becomes M |= Fp ∨ p.
3. Finally, we may change the model checking obligation into M |= Fp via the
rule (Disj).
In the real implementation, we may perform a “max-match” rule-selection
strategy, as depicted in Algorithm 1. In Line 15, for a rule “Cond B ψ ≈ η”,
1. the simpler Cond is, and
2. the shorter η is,
the higher priority to be chosen it has. Hence, a model-independent always has
a higher priority than a model-dependent one. We can see that the reduction
can be accomplished within O(|ϕ|) iterations.
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3.3 Performance Analysis of the Reduction
We now try to answer the question “why we can gain a better performance
during verification if CePRe is conducted first”. To give a rigorous explanation,
we briefly revisit the implementation of symbolic model checking algorithms.
The core procedure of BDD-based LTL symbolic model checking algorithm
is to construct a tableau for the (negated) property. In what followed, we refer
the tableau of ϕ as Tϕ, and we would give an analysis on its major components
affecting the cost of model checking.
State space: The state space of Tϕ consists of subsets of el(ϕ), and the set
el(ϕ) can be inductively computed as follows.
– el(>) = el(⊥) = ∅.
– el(p) = {p} if p ∈ P.
– el(ϕ1 → ϕ2) = el(ϕ1) ∪ el(ϕ2).
– el(Xψ) = {Xψ} ∪ el(ψ), and el(Yψ) = {Yψ} ∪ el(ψ).
– el(ϕ1Uϕ2) = el(ϕ1)∪el(ϕ2)∪{X(ϕ1Uϕ2)} and el(ϕ1Sϕ2) = el(ϕ1)∪el(ϕ2)∪
{Y(ϕ1Sϕ2)}.
With symbolic representation, each formula ψ ∈ el(ϕ) corresponds to a
proposition in building the tableau. Moreover, if ψ ∈ P, then no new propo-
sition need to be introduced (since it has already been introduced in building
the symbolic representation of M), otherwise, a fresh proposition pψ is required.
Hence the total number of newly introduced propositions equals to |el(ϕ) \ P|.
From an induction over formula’s structure, we have the following claim.
Proposition 1. |el(ϕ) \ P| equals to the number of temporal operators in ϕ.
Transitions: The transition relation of Tϕ is a conjunction of a set of constraints,
and each constraint is either of the form pXψ ↔ σ′(ψ) or p′Yη ↔ σ(η), where
Xψ,Yη ∈ el(ϕ), and the function σ can inductively defined as follows.
– σ(⊥) = ⊥ and σ(>) = >.
– σ(p) = p for each p ∈ P.
– σ(ψ1 → ψ2) = σ(ψ1)→ σ(ψ2).
– σ(Xψ1) = pXψ1 and σ(Yψ2) = pYψ2 .
– σ(ψ1Uψ2) = σ(ψ2) ∨ σ(ψ1) ∧ pX(ψ1Uψ2) and σ(ψ1Sψ2) = σ(ψ2) ∨ σ(ψ) ∧
pY(ψ1Uψ2).
According to the definition of el, we can see that each ψ ∈ sub(ϕ) rooted at a
future (reps. past) temporal operator exactly produces one formula Xη (resp.
Yη) in el(ϕ), and hence a new proposition pXη (resp. pYη) would be introduced.
Subsequently, each such pXη (reps. pYη) adds exactly one constraint to the
transition relation. Hence, we have the following claim.
Proposition 2. The number of constraints in the transition relation of Tϕ equals
to the number of temporal operators occurring in ϕ (alternatively, |el(ϕ) \ P|).
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Fairness constraints: According to the tableau construction, each ψ ∈ subU(ϕ)
would impose a fairness constraint to Tϕ. Hence, the number of fairness con-
straints equals to |subU(ϕ)|.
With a case-by-case checking, we can show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let “Cond B ϕ ≈ ψ” be a reduction rule, then we have |el(ψ)\P| ≤
|el(ϕ) \ P| and |subU(ψ)| ≤ |subU(ϕ)|.
In contrast, the cost of BMC is quite sensitive to the encoding approach. In
a broad sense, we can categorize the encoding approaches into two fashions.
Syntactic encoding Such kind of encodings are inductively produced w.r.t.
the formula’s structure. The very original one is presented in [1], and this
is improved in [4] by observing some properties of that encoding. In [9] (as
well in [2]), a linear incremental syntactic encoding is suggested.
Semantic encoding In [5], an alternative BMC technique is provided: it mim-
ics the tableau-based model checking process, but it express the fair-path
detection upon the product model with Boolean formula.2
For the semantic encodings, the reason that we can benefit from CePRe is
exactly the same as that for BDD-based approach. Because, the encoding is a
conjunction of a k-step unrolling of M and a k-step unrolling of Tϕ (an unrolling
is either a partial linear structure, or a one ending with a loop). The former
is usually in a fixed pattern, and for the latter we need k × |el(ϕ) \ P| new
propositions, and the sizes of Boolean formulae w.r.t the transition and fairness
constraints3 are respectively O(k × |el(ϕ) \ P|) and O(k2 × |subU(ϕ)|).
For a syntactic BMC encoding, one need to generate a Boolean formula of
the form EkM ∧ Ek¬ϕ, where EkM is the “unrolling” of M with k steps, and Ek¬ϕ
describes that the k-step unrolling causes a violation of ϕ. In general, EkM is
almost the same in all syntactic encodings, and the key factor affecting the cost
lies in Ek¬ϕ.
Given a subformula ψ of ϕ, if we use ||Ekψ|| to denote the max length of the
Boolean formula describing that ψ is initially satisfied upon a k-step unrolling,
then it can be inductively computed as follows.
– ||Ek⊥|| = ||Ek>|| = 0. 4
– ||Ekp || = 1 for each p ∈ P.
– ||Ekϕ1→ϕ2 || = ||Ekϕ1 ||+ ||Ekϕ2 ||+ 1.
– ||EkXψ|| = ||EkYψ|| = ||Ekψ||.
– ||Ekϕ1Uϕ2 || = ||Ekϕ1Sϕ2 || = L(k)× ||Ekϕ1 ||+ k × ||Ekϕ2 ||. 5
2 In [8], a “fixpoint”-based encoding is proposed, and we also attribute this technique
to semantic encoding in this paper.
3 Note that the part w.r.t. fairness constraints can be linearized.
4 This is just for the case when ⊥ or > appears as a subformula in the specification,
and hence can be optimized; otherwise, we have ||Ek⊥|| = ||Ek>|| = 1.
5 Note that this case does not imply that further blow-up would be caused with
deeper nesting of temporal operators. For example, in [9], by introducing sharing
propositions and reusing, it still leads to a linear encoding for the whole formula.
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Here, L(k) is some polynomial about k, related to the encoding approach. For
example, with the technique proposed in [1, 8], we have L(k) ∈ O(k2), whereas
L(k) ∈ O(k) in [9]. This partly explains the reason that we tend to change
temporal nestifications with Boolean combinations, as done in (UU[3→ 2]) etc.
Another feature affecting the cost is the number of propositions occurring in
the encoding. If we denote by vark(ϕ) the set of additional propositions which
only taking part in the encoding of Ek¬ϕ, then we have the following conclusions.
– For the techniques proposed in [1] and [4], we have vark(ϕ) = 0. i.o.w., all
propositions required in encoding Ek¬ϕ can be shared with those for E
k
M .
– In term of the encoding presented in [9], we need to add O(k) new proposi-
tions to vark(ϕ) for each U-subformula and for each S-subformula.
Theorem 3. Let “Cond B ϕ ≈ ψ” be a reduction rule, then we have ||Ekψ|| ≤
||Ekϕ|| and |vark(ψ)| ≤ |vark(ϕ)| in syntactic encodings.
4 Experimental Results
We have integrated CePRe as an upfront option in NuSMV. 6 We have con-
ducted experiments upon both industrial benchmarks and random generated
cases in terms of both BDD-based and bounded model checking (and the BMC
encoding approach here we adapt is that proposed in [4], which is the current
implementation of NuSMV).
We conduct the experiments under such platform: CPU - Intel Core Duo2
E4500 2.2GHz, Mem - 2G Bytes, OS - Ubuntu 10.04 Linux, Cudd -v2.4.1.1,
Zchaff -v2007.3.12.
4.1 Experiments upon Industrial Benchmarks
The benchmark we choose in this paper is from [2], and most of them come from
real hardware verification.
Table 1 provides experimental results for BDD-based LTL symbolic model
checking. The field #Time is the summation of user time and system time, and
the field #R.S. refers to the number of totally reachable states. For Table 1, we
have the following remarks:
1. 8 out of 16 specifications could be reduced with CePRe (and these specifi-
cations have been highlighted).
2. For the specifications that can be reduced, considerable improvements are
made in allocating resources. The most significant case is Pit.g.ltl — with
CePRe, the number of BDD nodes are decreased to 12.5% of that without
using CePRe.
6 The tool is available in http://sourceforge.net/projects/nusmvwithcepre, and
all SMV manuscripts for experiments can be found in the folder of /files/benchmark
and /files/random from that site.
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Without CePRe With CePRe
Model Spec. #BDD- #R.S. #Time #BDD- #R.S. #Time
-Nodes (sec.) -Nodes (sec.)
srg5 Ptimo.ltl 7946 720 0.024 2751 720 0.016
Pti.gnv.ltl 29704 11460 0.058 5712 2880 0.012
Pti.g.ltl 64749 130048 0.048 8119 32768 0.016
abp4 P2false.ltl 99577 559104 0.200 99625 559104 0.202
P2true.ltl 61209 904384 0.066 56494 419296 0.064
Pold.ltl 52301 353536 0.060 52349 353536 0.064
Ptimo.ltl 78098 219616 0.080 78146 219616 0.088
Pti.g.ltl 8385 200704 0.060 8433 200704 0.062
dme3 P0.ltl 889773 35964 5.756 527983 26316 5.096
P1.ltl 455148 8775 0.460 409432 5505 0.374
dme5 Mdl.ltl 793942 8.64316e+06 167.346 814494 3.2097e+06 114.599
Wat.ltl 412867 1.79217e+07 302.005 967033 1.12567e+07 286.850
Ptimo.neg 508036 1.26202e+06 3.260 508081 1.26202e+06 3.280
msi w- Sched.ltl 2275558 7.31055e+07 6.612 2275655 7.31055e+07 6.632
trans Safety.ltl 1213308 3.6528e+07 7.568 1213460 3.6528e+07 7.644
Seq.ltl 1921973 3.5946e+07 93.570 1702585 1.7973e+07 94.085
Table 1. Comparative results of BDD-based MC with/without CePRe.
3. Something noteworthy we do not provide in the table is that: if a violated
LTL specification can be reduced, the newly generated counterexample is
usually shorter than that of before. Among 8 specifications that can be re-
duced, counterexample-lengths of Pti.nuv.ltl, Pit.g.ltl, P0.ltl and Seq.ltl are
respectively shortened to 15, 10 and 194, opposing to the original values
16, 12 and 217. Meanwhile, counterexample-lengths of others are kept un-
changed.
Table 2 yields the experimental results for BMC-based model checking, and
we here give some comments on that.
1. With NuSMV, one need to preset a max-bound when doing bounded model
checking. The column #Max-bound gives such values — a “star mark”
means that this bound does not reach the completeness threshold. The field
#N.O.C. designates the number of clauses generated during model checking.
2. From the table, we can see that without CePRe the specification Pti.gnv.ltl
generates 2101 clauses when a counterexample is detected, in contrast, it
only produces 299 clauses if CePRe is switched on.
3. Another impressive comparison is for P0.ltl upon dme3: If we don’t do any
reduction, the SAT-solver reports a SEGMENTATION FAULT at Step 35.
In contrast, using CePRe, a counterexample could be found at Step 62.
4. Since the encoding approach we adapt is taken from [4], propositions used
in the encoding are only determined by the model and the bound, thus
the number of required propositions does not change. For this reason, the
corresponding experimental results on proposition numbers are not provided.
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Without CePRe With CePRe #Max-
Model Spec. #N.O.C. #Time #N.O.C. #Time bound
(sec.) (sec.)
srg5 Ptimo.ltl 272567 67.391 1371 0.143 20
Pti.gnv.ltl 2101 0.116 299 0.024 6
Pti.g.ltl 21 0.016 21 0.016 1
abp4 P2false.ltl 7532 3.972 7532 3.972 17
P2true.ltl 12639 8.145 9369 7.753 20?
Pold.ltl 7499 9.087 7499 9.488 20?
Ptimo.ltl 6332 2.500 6332 2.512 16
Pti.g.ltl 11952 0.841 11952 0.976 20?
dme3 P0.ltl − − 35102 524.207 62
P1.ltl 216 0.036 167 0.048 1
dme5 Mdl.ltl 90 0.044 90 0.048 0
Wat.ltl 367 0.048 274 0.052 1
Ptimo.neg 367 0.050 277 0.058 1
msi w- Sched.ltl 14235 1.076 14235 1.078 20?
trans Safety.ltl 12439 8.441 12439 8.448 20?
Seq.ltl 1907 0.064 81 0.052 3
Table 2. Experimental results of BMC-based MC with/without CePRe.
It should be pointed that both model-independent and model-dependent rules
contribute to the reductions. For example, for the model srg5 and specification
Pti.g.ltl, the rules (FS) and (S) are applied; meanwhile, for the model msi wtrans
and the specification Seq.ltl, the rule (UU[¬2→ 3]) takes part in the reduction.
4.2 Experiments w.r.t. Random Models and Specifications
We have also performed experiments upon randomly generated models and spec-
ifications with the tool Lbtt [13] and with the methodology suggested in [2].
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
B
D
D
 N
o d
e s
x  
1 0
0 0
0
WithoutCePRe
WithCePRe
Length of spec.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R
e a
c h
a b
l e
 s t
a t
e s
x  
1 0
0 0
WithoutCePRe
WithCePRe
Length of spec.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
t i m
e  
( s
)
WithouCePRe
WithCePRe
Length of spec.
Fig. 9. Experimental results on BDD-based model checking for random cases.
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Fig. 10. Experimental results on bounded model checking for random cases.
For each 3 ≤ ` ≤ 7, we randomly generate 40 specifications having length `.
Subsequently, for each specification, we generate two models respectively for the
BDD-based model checking and for BMC. Hence, we totally have 200 specifica-
tions and 400 models.
For the BDD-based model checking, we give the comparative results on 1)
the scale of BDD-nodes, 2) the number of reachable-states, and 3) the time
consumed, as shown in Figure 9. For BMC, we have set the max-bound to 20
and we have compared 1) the number of clauses, and 2) the executing time,
as shown in Figure 10. Each value here we provide is the average of the 40
executions.
For the BDD-based model checking, there are 123 (out of 200) specifications
can be reduced; whereas for BMC, the number of specifications that can be
reduced is 118.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a new technique to reduce LTL specifications’ com-
plexity towards symbolic model checking, namely, CePRe. The novelty in this
technique is that the formula being reduced need not to be logically equiva-
lent with the one after reduction, but just need to preserve the counterexample
set. Moreover, the condition enabling such a reduction can be usually detected
with lightweight approaches, such as SAT-solving. Hence, this technique could
leverage the power of SAT-solvers.
The central part of CePRe is a set of reduction rules, and soundness of
these reduction rules are fairly easy to check. For the model dependent rules,
additional conditions mainly concern invariants and transitions only, and we do
not make a sufficient use of other features, such as fairness. In this paper, we just
consider combinations of two temporal operators as many as possible, indeed,
there might be other possible reduction schemas we are not aware. Indeed, in
this paper, we tentatively to provide such a framework, and one can extend it
to model checking of other logics.
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From the experimental results, we can see that, in a statistical perspective,
we can gain a better performance and lower overhead with CePRe.
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